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1.0. Introduction: paradoxes, contradictions, accomplishments 
  
  The subject of the position of Spain in the world (through history, recent times, and 
today) has been described by scholars and casual observers by a combination of qualifiers. It is 
considered paradoxical, unique and influential, riddled with isolation and ambition, resulting in 
frustration and success. In any event, Spain’s record in modern times has to be considered as 
below its potential in historical terms, geographical position, culture and world presence through 
migration and the results of the empire. In any way, Spain deserves to be included among one of 
about twenty five countries that, for one reason or another, play a role in the overall current 
global panorama. 
1 
                                                           
 Extended version of a paper presented at a conference organized by the Jean Moment Chair and the European 
Union center of excellence of the University Topr Vergata, held in Rome on July 10-14, 2011. For the development 
of this study, the author would like to thank the generous invitation extended by Federiga Bindi to participate in the 
conference, and the bibliographical and editing assistance provided by Maxime Larivé and Beverly Barrett. 
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1 For a review of classic books on Spain’s foreign policy, see: Rafael Calduch, ed. La política exterior española en el 
siglo XX. (Madrid: Ed. Ciencias Sociales, 1994); James W. Cortada, ed. Spain in the Twentieth-Century World: Essays 
on Spanish Diplomacy, 1898-1978. (London: Aldwich Press, 1980); Richard Gillespie, Fernando Rodrigo, y Jonathan 
Story, eds. Las relaciones exteriores de la España democrática (Madrid: Alianza, 1995); Kenneth Maxwell and 
Steve Spiegel. The New Spain: From Isolation to Influence. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994);  
Kenneth Maxwell, ed. Spanish Foreign and Defense Policy. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Roberto Mesa.  La 
reinvención  de  la  política  exterior  de  España,  (Madrid:  Centro  de  Estudios  Constitucionales,  1996);  Fernando 
Morán, Una política exterior para España (Barcelona: Planeta, 1980); Fernando Morán, España en su sitio. (Barcelona: 
Plaza  y  Janés/Cambio  16,  1990);  Juan  Carlos  Pereira,  ed.  La  política  exterior  de  España:  De  1800  hasta  Hoy. 
(Barcelona: Ariel, 2003, 2010); Juan Carlos Pereira, Introducción al estudio de la política exterior de España (siglos XIX 
y XX). (Madrid: Akal, 1983); Benny Pollack and Graham Hunter. The Paradox of Spanish Foreign Policy. Spain's 
International Relations from Franco to Democracy. (London: Pinter, 1987). 
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Today, for example, Spain is ranked between the 8
th and the 12
th world economic power, 
it  has  been  customarily  invited  to  participate  in  the  group  of  20,  and  it  is  the  third  tourist 
destination of the planet, as well as the second recipient of immigrants. Spanish is the second-
second language of the globe, its contemporary painters and singers are famous worldwide, its 
sport stars have obtained impressive recent triumphs, and its diplomats and international officers 
have  occupied  important  positions  such  as  President  the  International  Olympic  Committee, 
UNESCO,  and  key  institutions  of  the  EU  (Parliament,  Court,  High  Representative).  While 
official  development  figures  in  Latin  American  shows  Spain  to  be  number  one  donor  and 
Spanish investment has led the EU and surpassed U.S. activity in some parts of Latin American, 
Spanish troops are present in a dozen of international security and peace keeping missions, as 
well as in war dangerous scenarios.   
While in comparative historical terms Spaniards today live (in a greater number) by far 
much better than in past decades and centuries, Spain also suffers of poor business productivity. 
It is in the middle of an economic crisis and financial danger, including default, following the 
steps  of  Greece.  Unemployment  is  around  20%  (40%  for  youths).  Citizen  insecurity  and 
organized international crime are common. On top of that, Basque ETA terrorism is the only 
remain of that scourge in the EU. Spain has been the victim of the worst Al Qaeda terrorist 
attack, only second to September 11. 
School performance is at the bottom of the EU levels, no Spanish university is among the 
top world 200, and their graduates are opting for emigration. The building bubble has been 
terminated, the Spanish population is graying in unbearable numbers, the welfare state is on the 
verge  of  collapsing,  and  people  are  losing  confidence  in  the  political  system,  a  well-earned 
impeccable democracy after centuries of authoritarian and dictatorial regimes.  
In  sum,  Spain  has  become  a  “normal”  western  country,  coping  with  contemporary 
challenges and problems, well-inserted in the European Union and world-wide networks.  Its 
foreign policy and international relations networks are reflecting all this. 
In  general  terms,  it  can  be  said  that  Spain’s  position  in  Europe  and  the  world  has 
oscillated from an impressive state apparatus  enjoying for a couple of centuries  an enviable 
world  imperial  power  (1500s  and  1600s)  to  a  long  time  (since  the  late  1700s)  of  isolation, 
leading to a recent rich period of solid presence and influence (after the rebirth of democracy in 
1976). This status is still perceptible today, with the limitations imposed by internal and external 
circumstances, not considered as chronic and threatening for returning Spain to a position of 
irrelevancy. There are too many factors in today’s world and in the internal fabric of Spain that 
will  contribute  to  the  successful  recovery  of  the  economy  and  the  solving  of  the  domestic 
problems. It is with this panorama in mind than an analysis of the position of Spain in Europe 
and the world will be offered in the following pages. 
 
 
2.1. Historical review: an empire returning home  
 
In  spite  of  its  physical  centrality  in  a  regular  western  mapamundi,  with  the  Atlantic 
showcased in the middle, the reality is that the geography of Spain does not help in the fostering 5 
 
domestic of communications and does not invite in building links with the rest of Europe and the 
world. Natural deep water harbors are few and small, its rivers are not navigable, mountainous 
blocs cover the country separated by the Pyrenees from its closest neighbor beyond the peninsula 
that shares with Portugal. For centuries, all kinds of peoples visited, populated, conquered and 
civilized the land, contributing to forge a special brand of ethnic entity, not much different than 
the rest of Europe, a mix of Mediterranean and Celtic texture, maintaining certain peculiarities. 
Since the completion of the “Reconquest“ from the long eight-century Muslim domination in 
1492, Spain became trapped in extirpating all signs of different cultures, making one religion and 
language, centralism, and authoritarian policies the norm.    
But in any event, Spain is, after all, a European nation by traditions and law, philosophy 
and literature, language diversity and cultural features. This apparently unnecessary statement 
needs to be fully considered in any study of Spanish foreign policy and relations. This reality is 
attributed to a combination of factors and assumptions and perceptions (domestic and foreign). 
On  the  one  hand,  Spain,  besides  having  consolidated  its  official  status  as  a  state  in  the 
Westphalia tradition much earlier than most of the existing entities of Europe, it was for a long 
time a world-wide empire with presence in all continents, from the Philippines to North Africa, 
from the vicinity of Canada to the South Pole.  
For over a “Golden Century”, the sun never set in its dominions, as the unofficial motto 
read. In spite of the wrong credit given to Ferdinand Magellan (killed in mid trip), the first sailor 
to circumnavigate the world was his deputy in a Spanish crown, Juan Sebastián Elcano. Half of 
Europe was at one point ruled by the vision of Spanish Hapsburgs (most specially Charles V and 
Philip II), heirs of Castile’s Queen Isabella and Aragon-Catalonia’s King Ferdinand. The royal 
couple completed the mission of crafting an empire via a personal partnership, keeping their 
respective  kingdoms  officially  intact,  but  prone  to  compete  and  disagree,  resisting  full 
unification.  Regional  rivalries  and  civil  wars  became  the  norm,  leaving  a  legacy  until 
contemporary times.    
Columbus  sailed,  by  mistake,  to  America  at  the  service  of  Castile,  paid  by  Spanish 
bankers,  in  ships  populated  by  Spanish  visionaries,  to  be  followed  by  conquistadors  who 
traversed the continent for glory and for gold. It is ironic that the mineral riches extracted by 
American natives enslaved by Spanish colonial officials were used to finance the European wars 
that the Spanish monarchs needed in order to anchor the imperial presence in the old continent.    
In any event, the fact is that most of today’s Latin America became populated initially by 
Spanish agents and later by masses of immigrants that made the footprint of Spain permanent. It 
is in great part for this reason that the official Spanish national day is the 12
th of October, an 
anomaly in western nations that have chosen the date of independence or the change of regime to 
commemorate the birth or consolidation of a given national identity. Spain, therefore, became a 
country  of  America  by  choice  and  fate,  but  remained  a  European  entity  by  history  and 
geographical necessity. 
At  the  end  of  the  1700s  Spain  fell  into  a  long  period  of  isolation  and  international 
irrelevancy.  After  liberating  itself  of  the  occupation  by  Napoleonic  France,  Spain  did  not 
participate in the post-Vienna European network. In turn, it entangled itself in internal struggles 
derived from past dynastical inadequacies and claims regarding which branch of the European 6 
 
monarchies should rule the country. Meanwhile, the old formidable overseas empire vanished in 
the first decades of the 1800s. Less than a century later, in 1898 the United States, the new world 
power, suddenly reminded Spain of its weakness and the real nature of its remaining colonial 
presence in the Caribbean and the Far East. Ironically, this defeat produced an introspective 
enrichment of the intellectual circles. The Generation of ’98 began to seek for answers on the 
reasons for the Spanish decline, proposing ways to correct the course of history and define a new 
national identity.  
As a result of the loss of the control over Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines, the 
Spanish monarchy was pressed by the resentful military, which blamed the politicians for the 
defeat, and changed scenarios of attention, concentrating on North Africa, making Morocco the 
object of desire. King Alfonso XIII was unable to cope with the unstable political forces of the 
1920s in a dangerous ideological setting of Europe between the two big European conflicts and 
the rise of extreme ideologies. As a recourse, he then allowed General Miguel Primo de Rivera to 
take charge as de-facto dictator (1923-1930). Domestic errors and political pressures forced the 
monarch to resign in 1931.  
The Second Spanish Republic (1931-1936) was established, ending in disaster as a victim 
of the rebellion staged by General Francisco Franco, leading to the Spanish Civil War of 1936-
39. This internal conflict was in essence a dress rehearsal for World War II. As a victor of the 
Spanish War thanks in large part to the help of military assistance of  Hitler’s Germany and 
Mussolini’s Italy, with a hands-off policy of Western democracies, Franco then decided to side 
with  the  Axis  sending  a  full  infantry  division  to  the  Russian  front.  When  the  Nazi  regime 
collapsed, the democratic West  punished the Spanish  regime with  isolation  and banning for 
joining the new international structures, especially the United Nations. Spain again became an 
international pariah. An exception to the world-wide opposition to Franco was the Argentine 
government of Juan Perón, who provided food support.  
Meanwhile,  Franco  stressed  that  the  real  enemy  was  communism,  a  message  that 
attracted the favor of the United States, ready to stop the Soviets in Europe. The United States 
then decided to normalize relations with Spain in the 50s. Truman provided U.S. $ 62.5 million 
for aid, while supported a UN resolution lifting the boycott. The period of isolation ended. In 
1953 Franco signed a Concordat with the Vatican and the alliance with the United States. During 
the first ten years of the Pact of Madrid, the United States gave Spain US$1.5 billion in aid. In 
1955,  the  UN  approved  Spain's  membership.  The  honeymoon  between  the  two  countries 
climaxed when President Eisenhower visited Madrid in 1959. 
It is then, at the same time rather paradoxical and logical sense, that one of the most 
widely  quoted  commentaries  of  the  position  of  Spain  in  the  world  was  crafted  by  Spanish 
philosopher  José  Ortega  y  Gasset  in  the  1920s:  “Spain  is  the  problem  and  Europe  is  the 
solution”.  While  a  nostalgic  feeling  for  America  still  survived,  the  obsessive  need  to  be  a 
standard and normal European country became the centerpiece of the Spanish agenda. However, 
this  aim  (in  economic  and  strategic  terms),  which  was  shared  by  intellectuals  and  well-
intentioned political leaders, had to wait to be fully implemented until the end of the long Franco 
dictatorship. 7 
 
In contrast with the U.S. favor, Spain’s European neighbors were not inclined to accept 
Franco in NATO and the EC. In spite of the signing of a Trade Preference Treaty in 1970, the 
fundamental political issue of the incompatibility of the regime continued to bloc membership in 
the Community. The EC was then perceived by Spanish democrats as a solution for the ending of 
the regime, in a remake of the Ortega’s admonition. The regime helped in preparing Spanish 
economy  through  hard  measures  for  an  eventual  agreement.  The  Spanish  citizens  and  the 
business community, with the exception of certain sectors that feared competition against tariff 
protection,  favoured  that  goal  and  endorsed  Felipe  González  aggressive  policy  to  obtain 
admission  at  any  cost.  Critics  then  pointed  out  that  the  political  agenda  weakened  the 
government’s  bargaining  position,  side-lining  the  possibility  of  negotiations.  At  any  rate, 
accession is one of the most important political, economic and socials successes in the history of 
the country. 
 
2.2. Anchored in Europe 
 
After the demise of the Franco regime, Spain  saw that its  world  position  was  rather 
weakly anchored. In one of the Europe-wide conclaves that would lead to the establishment of 
the Conference for Security in Europe, Spanish diplomats realized that the only two European 
states that did not belong to any of the military or deeply economic networks were Spain… and 
the Vatican. This situation had to be drastically corrected. A frantic agenda then dominated the 
efforts of the Spanish government. A sort of practical example of a Spanish saying seemed to 
preside over the movements of Madrid: “apuntarse a todo” [sign up for everything]. Than meant 
that at an initial stage of Spanish democratic rebirth Spain even insisted in belonging to the 
Movement  of  Non-Aligned  countries.  This  was  oddity  while  for  decades  the  country  was 
attached to the security and defense strategy of the United States through the military agreements 
for the use of the air and naval bases.  
In any event the international record of belonging was impressive. Spain ratified the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights and became a member of the Council of Europe in 1977, joined 
NATO in 1981, and acceded to the European Community in 1986. International mediation was 
recognized by the celebration of the Middle East Peace Conference held in Madrid in 1991 and 
the foundation of the Mediterranean process in 1995, a project that has left as a legacy of the 
work of Spanish diplomacy the establishment of the General Secretariat of the Union for the 
Mediterranean in Barcelona. 
The  record  of  Spain’s  membership  in  the  European  Union  has  proven  to  be  truly 
impressive.
2 As briefly expressed above, during the second part of the Franco regime Spain tried 
                                                           
2 For a selection of classic and recent books on the insertion of Spain in the EU, see the following:  Carlos Closa and 
Paul Heywood. Spain and the European Union. (New York: Palgrave, 2004);  Ramón Tamames. La larga marcha 
de España a la Unión Europea (Madrid: Edimadoz, 1999); Richard Gillespie and Richard Youngs. Spain: The 
European and International Challenges. (London: Frank Cass, 2001); Esther Barbé. La política europea de España. 
(Barcelona: Ariel, 1999); Julio Crespo MacLennan. Spain and the Process of European Integration, 1957-85. (New 
York: Palgrave, 2000); Rachel Jones. Beyond the Spanish State: Central Government, Domestic Actors and the EU. 
(New York: Palgrave, 2000); Mary Farrell. Spain in the EU: The Road to Economic Convergence. (New York: 
Palgrave,  2001);    Raimundo  Bassols.  España  en  Europa:  historia  de  la  adhesión a la  CE,  1957-85.  (Madrid: 8 
 
to  cope  with  requirements  that  were  politically  impossible  to  meet.  When  Spain  became  a 
member of the EC, numerous experts and scholars were ready to join the effort and strengthen 
the resources available in Spanish universities and publishing networks.
3 Simultaneously, the 
best and the brightest of Spain’s governmental cadres joined the expanded institutions, taking on 
positions of responsibility in decision-making bodies.
4 Spain, in sum, “was not different.” as a 
redrafting  of  a  popular  tourism  slogan  crafted  by  the  Franco  regime  would  say.  It  was  a 
European country like any other that was returning to its natural home after a long exile. In the 
background of successful EU Spanish presidencies, prominent Spaniards had chaired the EU 
institutions.
5  When the process of drafting the Constitutional Treaty was announced, Spain 
embraced the mission, rather than regarding it as a standard duty. 
Spain,  in  turn,  received  considerable  benefits  through  funds  of  regional  policies, 
development aid, and financing of infrastructure. From an index of 60 percent of the European 
median  in  1986,  today  Spain’s  income  is  in  the  range  of  105  percent,  with  some  regions 
surpassing 125 percent. From being a country that was a net receiver of aid, Spain is today a net 
payer,  with  traditional  funds  vanishing,  resulting  in  the  considerable  alarm  of  public  works 
officers struggling in the middle of the current crisis.
6 
The  year  2010  was  to  be  remembered  in  the  European  Union  (EU)  circles  of 
governmental Spain as a milestone. During the first semester, from January to June 2010, Spain 
held the rotating presidency. On June 12, Spain celebrated the 25
th anniversary of its adhesion 
(along with Portugal) to the European integration experiment, by signing the treaty, effectively 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Política Exterior, 1995); Michael Marks. The Formation of European Policy in Post-Franco Spain: The Role of 
Ideas,  Interests,  and  Knowledge.  (Avebury:  Ashgate,  1997);  Amparo  Almarcha  Barbado,  ed.  Spain  and  EC 
Membership Evaluated. (London: Pinter, 1993); Mary Farrell. Spain in the EU: The road to Economic Convergence. 
(New York: Palgrave, 2001); Angel Viñas, Al servicio de Europa: Innovación y crisis en la Comisión Europea. 
Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 2006; Francesc Morata and Gemma Mateo, eds..España en Europa, Europa en 
España (1986-2006), (Barcelona, CIDOB, 2007); Francesc Granell, ed. Veinte años de España en la integración 
Europea. (Barcelona: Real Academia de Ciencias Económicas y Financieras, 2006); Joaquín Roy and María Lorca. 
Spain in the European Union: the First Fifty Years (1986-2006). (Miami: European Union Center/Jean Monnet 
Chair, 2011). 
 
3 For a selection of the classic textbooks and standard reference works on the EU developed and used in Spanish 
universities, see: Victoria Abellán y Blanca Vilà. Lecciones de Derecho Comunitario Europeo. (Barcelona: Ariel, 
1993;  Francesc Morata. La Unión Europea: Procesos, actores y políticas. (Barcelona: Ariel, 1998.);  Aldecoa 2002;  
Araceli Mangas y Diego J. Liñán Nogueras. Instituciones y derecho de la Unión Europeas. (Madrid: Mc.Graw-Hill, 
1996); and Donato Fernández Navarrete. Historia y economía de la Unión Europea  ( Madrid: Centro de Estudios 
Ramón Areces, 1999). 
 
4Angel Viñas, ed. "Las políticas comunitarias: una visión interna," Información Comercial Española, No. 831, July-
August. (Madrid: 2006); Francesc Granell. Catalunya dins la Unió Europea: Política, economía i societat. 
(Barcelona: Edicions 62, 2002). 
 
5 Vi￱as, “Las políticas”. 
 
6 For a selection of the bibliography on the experience of Spain in the EU, see: Almarcha, Barbé 1995, Closa & 
Heywood  2004, Crespo 1986, Farrell 2001, Gillespie &  Youngs  2001, Granell 2006, Marks 1997, Roy & Kanner 
2001, Royo/Manuel 2003.  
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acceding to the European Community (EC) on January 1, 1986. While all of this was happening, 
the  new  Reform  Treaty  (“of  Lisbon”)  was  implemented  as  a  substitute  for  the  failed 
constitutional  text.  These  spectacular  events  unraveled  in  the  middle  of  one  of  the  worst 
economic crises of the world, with considerable impact on the evolution of the EU and, most 
especially, Spain. 
  Spain had made the effort of rescuing the lost Constitution. The government considered 
several options and scenarios; each implied risks and opportunities in the rescuing of the spirit of 
the original text. More than anything else, Spain wanted to show the same loyal commitment as 
performed  since  1986.  From  all  angles  of  analysis,  the  balance  of  this  obsession  has  been 
positive.  
   The  successive  PSOE  governments  from  1982  to  1996  distinguished  themselves  in 
building fruitful alliances with the influential European partners, specially the Franco-German 
duo. In 1996, when the Popular Party, led by José María Aznar, won the elections, Spain’s 
European  commitment  was  in  essence  maintained.  Spain  was  early  in  the  lead  of  the 
constitutional project. However, as a result of the events of September 11, the government had 
decided to change its loyalty for a Euro-Atlantic alternative. Madrid elected to join the so-called 
“new  Europe,”  disdainful  of  the  “old  Europe,”  following  the  terminology  coined  the  U.S. 
Secretary  of  Defense  Donald  Rumsfeld.  Spain  voted  with  the  United  States  and  Britain  to 
support the UN Security Council resolution backing Bush’s policies, in contrast with EU fellow 
members of the Council, France and Germany. Aznar also tried to obtain the votes of Latin 
American countries (Mexico and Chile), with the result of offending them and making Spain-
Latin American relations difficult. 
Within the EU, Spain’s position shifted from unconditional siding with deepening the 
process  of  integration  to  a  more  intergovernmental  stance.  Under  the  pretense  of  defending 
national interests in the re-structuring of voting systems, the Spanish government started to be 
perceived as a hard bargainer. In the words of Aznar, Spanish needed not be considered as a 
“simpático”  member,  but  a  serious  one.  Simultaneously,  what  in  a  way  was  an  important 
ingredient in Spanish influence in the EU during the Socialist administrations, using variances of 
“soft” power” ceased to play a role. In a European Union that began to be different with the two 
successive enlargements of the “neutrals” and the formerly under the Soviet domination, Spain 
lost part of the leverage. This was reflected by the ending of nominations to important positions 
in the EU institutions, leaving only Javier Solana as isolated example of Spanish imprint as 
Secretary General of NATO and High Representative for the European Common Foreign and 
Security Policy. Lack of energy of the new Socialist administration of Zapatero from 2004 has 
led  to  a  series  of  failures  in  obtaining  important  assignments  for  Spanish  politicians  and 
diplomats. The latest of these fiascos was the nomination of former foreign minister Miguel 
Angel Moratinos as Director of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), who was 
beaten by a split vote of EU members, an anomaly in coordinated EU actions.                                 
The change of government in 2004 turned the setting to the traditional way of priming 
Europe, but the EU itself had changed in profile and attitude.
7 When the PSOE came back to 
                                                           
7For  a  sample  of  analysis  on  the  change  of  Spanish  attitude  from  the  policy  of  the  Partido  Popular  to  the 
performance of the PSOE when elected, see: Joaquín Roy. “Spain's Return to "Old Europe": Background and 10 
 
power in 2004, the government wanted to send a clear message of unconditional loyalty and 
efficient leadership in European integration. First, the new government decided to be the first of 
the group of Member States that submitted the ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty to 
a  public  referendum.  76.73  percent  of  the  participating  voters  (42.3  percent  of  the  actual 
electorate) said “yes,” setting the pace for the rest to emulate.  
  However, Spain’s recent path through the EU labyrinth offers a perceptive oscillation. On 
one  hand,  the  enthusiasm  with  which  the  successive  administrations,  starting  with  Felipe 
González in 1982, approached the process of European integration, priming the supranational 
path should be noted. On the other hand, this pattern would subtly contrast with the fractious 
ambivalence expressed  at  times by the  government of José María Aznar (1996-2004), more 
inclined towards an intergovernmental approach, especially during his second term from 2000 to 
2004 supported by an absolute majority
8. In part because of his support for the adventure taken 
by U.S. President George W. Bush in Iraq, Aznar led the inclination  of the  “New Europe” 
towards a neo-Atlanticism, damaging the deepening of the EU.  
  Nonetheless, the Spanish government, the academic community, and the media exerted 
an  impressive  influence  in  making  the  role  of  Spain  in  the  Convention  process  a  model  of 
participation.  The  government  (and  the  representatives  of  the  Popular  Party,  delegated  by 
Madrid) actively participated in the elaboration of the text of the Constitution.
9  However, in the 
last stages of the proceedings of the Intergovernmental Conference  (IGC) that took on the task 
given by the Convention, the government of Spain led by Aznar left the process in a frozen state 
when it refused to accept the new double majority voting system that modified the lineup that 
had been in effect since the Treaty of Nice.
10  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Consequences of the March 11 and 14, 2004 Terrorist Attacks and Elections”. Miami European Union 
Center/Jean Monnet Chair. Vol. 5, No. 6,  March 2005. www.miami.edu/eucenter/royaznarfinal.pdf 
 
 
8Richard  Pipes.  “Spain  and  the  European  Union”.  The  major  nation-states  in  the  European  Union.  (NY: 
Longman/Pearson, 2005), pp. 302-319.   
 
9 For selected books authored by Spanish protagonists: Borrell, Josep; Carlos  Carnero y Diego López Garrido. 
Construyendo la Constitución Europea: Crónica Política de la Convención. (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2003); 
López  Garrido,  Diego.  La  Constitución  Europea.  (Alicante:  Bomarzo,  2005);  Méndez  de  Vigo,  Iñigo  El 
rompecabezas: así redactamos la Constitución Europea. (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva/ Real Instituto Elcano, 2005). 
 
10 For details, see Raj S Chari., Alfonso Egea de Haro, Kenneth Benoit and Michel Laver.  “Spain and Europan 
Union Constitution Building”. Real Instituto Elcano, DDT, July 18, 2004. 
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3.0. Regional and global relations 
3.1. Complying with a standard traditional definition of foreign policy, general political and 
diplomatic  relations  of  a  country  is  a  prerogative  of  its  executive  branch,  although  the 
protagonism  exercise  by  other  branches  (especially  the  legislative)  has  made  the  task  of 
managing external relations rather diffuse.  
The monopoly of governing foreign policy resides mainly in the office of the President of 
Government (Prime Minister), delegated to its external unit, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Cooperation. This s the branch of the General State Administration which, under government 
control, is responsible for the an array of functions, among them the planning, directing, carrying 
out  and evaluating the  foreign policy of the State, coordinating Spain’s  relations with  other 
countries and with international organizations, executing the policy for international cooperation 
and  development,  protecting  Spanish  citizens  abroad  and  designing  immigration  policies.  In 
carrying out these functions, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation is assisted by four 
Secretaries of State and one Sub-secretary, as well as by the General Department of Foreign 
Communication, the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation (AECI) and the Cervantes 
Institute, dedicated to the promotion of culture and language teaching.  
However,  Spain’s  foreign  relations  are  not  a  monopoly  of  concrete  branches  of  the 
executive power. Congress has a major role in approving foreign policy. NGOs, civil society, 
media, and private companies have engaged in this collective endeavor. Above all, the more than 
symbolic  role  played  by  King  Juan  Carlos  I  should  be  recognized  by  his  prestige  in  world 
scenarios, most especially Latin America. In this framework, the world is divided into some 
major regions, each one with different degrees of priorities for Spain, as a result of history, 
geopolitics and pressing issues.           
 
3.2. The neighborhood 
  Relations with the rest of Europe and the United States have monopolized the attention of 
the successive Spanish  governments  since the rebirth  of democracy. However, this  does  not 
mean  that  Spain  has  forgotten  other  parts  of  the  world.  The  abandonment  of  the  isolation 
syndrome gave way to an ambitious policy of “normalization” of international links, beginning 
with the closest three neighbors. Spain, for example, can show a successful record of excellent 
relations with France and Portugal. The fact that both Iberian countries acceded jointly to the EU 
was a sign of synchronization of existing economic and political relations. Long gone were the 
times of resentment against France because of imperial competition, which in recent years were 
limited to the resistance of certain French interests to Spanish EU membership for economic 
reasons.  
A source of concern for the Spanish government at all times, Franco-Spanish bilateral 
cooperation has been excellent in the join fight against Basque ETA terrorism. An anomaly in 
the evolution of decolonization, the issue of Gibraltar has been systematically avoided to become 
a serious obstacle for UK-Spain cooperation. While it remains a sensitive topic, not only in terms 
of sovereignty but also because of the sue of the rock for money laundering and contraband, 
London and Madrid can be considered as very close allies in multiple scenarios. 
A standard description of Spain’s geographical location, taught to school pupils since 
times immemorial, include a classic scenario. “Spain –the lesson says—limits to the north with 
France, to the east and south with the Mediterranean Sea… and to the west with Portugal.” 
Seldom  there  was  an  explicit  reference  to  the  UK  colony  of  Gibraltar.  Morocco  was  not 12 
 
considered as a “neighbor” in the strict sense. Strategic, social and economic arguments dictate 
that Morocco is actually the most important of the neighbors in terms of difficulties in reaching 
trade agreements, migration, and consistent claims of sovereignty.  
 
 
3.3. France 
 
Enemy in long periods of history and an ally in convenient exceptions, France ceased to 
be part of the worries of successive Spanish regimes and governments of all forms since the 
Napoleonic  times.  The  impressive  Pyrenees  border  has  supported  this  mutually  beneficial 
civilized coexistence. Trade and investments have substituted dynastic and political ambitions in 
both countries. Spanish membership in the EU has, with few exceptions, ended animosity and 
envy.  Attractiveness  of  Spanish  exotic  culture  for  the  French  has  meshed  with  Spanish 
fascination for France’s culinary distinction. In recent times since the rebirth of democracy, for 
example, the goal of the Spanish governments have been in adhering to the joint strategy of 
Germany and France in acting within the European Union. Both countries are among the most 
important sources of investments, destinations of Spanish exports and origin of tourism. Only 
trade confrontations over competition of Spanish products have sometimes (just before Spanish 
EU membership, and more recently as a result of the economic crisis) made the Madrid-Paris 
relationship uncomfortable. Conservative and Socialist French Governments have interacted very 
well with the Spanish right and left in power. As mentioned above, the sensitive issue of refuge 
taken by ETA terrorists in France has been resolved by the decisive cooperation given by Paris in 
curtailing terrorists activities in French and detaining suspects of criminal acts, devoid of the old 
fashioned independentist cover.  
 
 
3.4. Portugal 
 
The  two  Iberian  countries,  Spain  and  Portugal,  share  geography,  history,  similar 
languages,  social  and  religious  developments,  a  romantic  nostalgia  for  imperial  colonial 
hegemonies, and a sense of loyal cooperation in a common European destiny. Ironically, while 
Spain has been sold as model for political transitions in other parts of the world, Portugal boasts 
of  the  precedent  over  Spain  of  getting  rid  of  autocratic  regimes.  The  Portuguese  peacefully 
toppled (by the “Carnation revolution”) the remains of the Oliveira Salazar (the oldest fascist-
leaning dictatorship in Europe) in April of 1974. This feat took well over one year before the end 
of the Spanish Franco regime. 
Paradoxically,  part  of  this  coexistence  devoid  of  animosity  or  wars  (a  common 
denominator in Europe’s violent history) has been the fact that both nations have evolved since 
the Middle Ages (Portugal is the oldest European nation-state) with a respectful mutual disdain. 
Not even the accidental fact that Portugal was part of Spain for some decades due to a dynastic 
cause (Phillip II) has been a source of Portuguese anti-imperialist feelings. The only remain of 
Portuguese resent is the small city Olivenza (Spanish)/Olivença (Portuguese) a disputed section 13 
 
of the border between the two countries, which claim it de jure, but it is administered de facto by 
Spain since 1801.  
Happy with forging historical alliances with other European powers (especially Britain), 
Portugal has lived a peaceful evolution that has led to a mutually economic relationship in which 
Spain has been the leader capturing large sectors of trade and industry, without causing notable 
Portuguese  resentment.  It  is  considered  as  an  unavoidable  phenomenon,  only  questioned  by 
small economic sectors and a part of the Portuguese intellectuals. As in the case of France-Spain 
political  relations,  Portuguese  socialists  and  conservatives  have  had  excellent  rapport  with 
ideologically diverse Spanish leaders. The two countries are so intertwined that Nobel Prize 
winner Jose Saramago once suggested in a seminal article that Portugal’s future was to become a 
Spanish autonomy. In recent times, a fraction of the right wing parties have used the Spanish 
economic  hegemony  to  capture  votes,  with  dubious  results.  Still,  with  inter-state  land 
communications not at the level of expressways and railways in Spain, the current financial crisis 
has caused the termination of the plans for a high speed train line between Madrid and Lisbon. 
11           
 
3.5. Gibraltar 
The return of Gibraltar to Spain’s sovereignty has remained a foreign policy goal for all 
Spanish rulers since the Treaty of Utrecht that gave control to the British in 1713. Franco closed 
the frontier between Spain and Gibraltar in 1969. Democratic governments engaged in calmer 
but persistent negotiations with London. Spain's membership in NATO added obstacles because 
Spain claimed Gibraltar to be a NATO naval base, something denied by the British government. 
The  most  delicate  issue  is  sovereignty,  but  the  30,000  residents  oppose  to  become  Spanish 
citizens. As an alternative for the continuation of the colonial status, innovative joint sovereignty 
has  been  suggested  as  well  as  a  variance  of  regional  autonomy  under  the  1978  Spanish 
Constitution might be a long-term solution  
                                                           
11 On the joint experience of Spain and Portugal as members of the EU, see: Joaquín Roy and Aimee Kanner. España 
y Portugal en la Unión Europea, (México: Universidad Autónoma de México, UNAM 2001); Joaquín Roy and 
Aimee Kanner. "Spain and Portugal in the European Union," The European Union and the Member States: Cooperation, 
Coordination, and Compromise in Eleanor E. Zeff and Ellen B. Pirro, eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001). pp. 235-263; 
Sebastián Royo, and Paul Christopher Manuel, editors. Spain and Portugal in the European Union: the first fifteen 
years (London/Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003). 
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3.6. Morocco 
   
To  the  south,  Morocco  has  continued  to  be  a  leading  priority  in  Spanish  policy  for 
reasons not only of high migration levels converting Spain in the main destination of Moroccan 
workers  and stepping stone of Sub-Saharan illegal  immigrants.  An important  concern is  the 
highly sensitive issue of the existing Spanish cities, Ceuta and Melilla, which territory is claimed 
by Morocco. A remain of the old Spanish protectorate and historical presence, the two cities are 
a permanent part of the bilateral agenda, but both governments are committed not to cross the 
dangerous line of confrontation, as it happened in 1957 when Moroccan irregulars back by the 
Moroccan army force Spain to leave the small enclave of Sidi Ifni and when in the last days of 
the Franco dictatorship in 1975 the Moroccan authorities staged a “green” march towards the 
Spanish  Western  Sahara  and  forced  the  partition  of  the  territory  between  Mauritania  and 
Morocco.  Eventually,  Morocco  ended  up  occupying  all  the  territory,  making  it  a  source  of 
autonomous native aims of independence and claims by neighboring Algeria. 
  Morocco has maintained that the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla were integral 
parts of the national sovereign territory. The two North African towns and their offshore islands 
had belonged to the Spanish crown for centuries. Both were administered as integral parts of 
Spain and had predominantly Spanish populations. Therefore, Spain insisted that they remain 
Spanish. When Spain joined the EC in 1986, Ceuta and Melilla were considered Spanish cities 
and European territory. The two cities claimed to be candidates for financial assistance from the 
EC's Regional Development Fund. Spain also hoped that membership in NATO, while providing 
no security guarantee to Ceuta and Melilla, might make Morocco's King Hassan II less likely to 
move against territory belonging to a NATO member. However, Spanish demands for the return 
of Gibraltar have consistently added fuel for Moroccan ambitions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 
4.0. The Western Hemisphere 
 
4.1. The United States: sleeping with the hegemon  
Spain’s relations with the United States offer a contrast between the norm of the usual 
contemporary  diplomatic  declarations  and  the  historical  record.  While  officials  consistently 
claim that the two countries have been steady allies, the evidence shows that Spain and the 
United  States  have  been  acting  very  often  on  different  sides,  distanced  from  each  other, 
indifferent  and at  times at  war with  each other. The exceptions  to  this norm have been the 
heralded help bestowed by Spain to the United States struggle for independence and the steady 
alliance since the signing of the treaties between Franco and Eisenhower. 
  History shows that the main reason for Spain to back the independence of the United 
States was to harass the British Empire as a competitor for the control of the Americas. Instead 
of a reward for this help, the United States aimed at Spain when it issued the Monroe declaration 
in 1823, threatening European powers to return to control the western hemisphere territories that 
were colonies in the past (most of South and central America). Spain, in turn, took advantage of 
weakness of the United States engaged in domestic difficulties (Civil War included) and briefly 
returned along France to Mexico, staged naval skirmishes in Peru and Chile, and accepted a 
return of sovereignty from the Dominican Republic. A direct serious war confrontation between 
Spain  and  the  United  States  took  place  in  1898  when  as  a  consequence  of  the  Cuban 
independence struggle Washington sent an ultimatum and then defeated the Spanish navy and 
army in Santiago de Cuba and Manila, occupying also Puerto Rico.  
A series of non-engagements took place during the first part of the Twentieth Century. It 
began with the contrast of the United States involvement in World War I with Spain’s neutrality. 
After the war, when Spain became an effective member of the Society of Nations, ironically the 
United States Senate refused to sign the treaty crafted by Woodrow Wilson. Officially neutral in 
World War II, the Franco regime, victor of the Spanish Civil, sent an army division to help Hitler 
in the invasion of Russia, as a reward for the help received during the bloody domestic struggle. 
The emotions of the American public were stirred profoundly by the outbreak of the Civil War in 
Spain.  Approximately  3,000  United  States  citizens  volunteered  to  serve  in  the  Spanish 
Republican Army, although the U.S. government remained neutral.  
Following  the  Nationalist  victory,  much  of  public  opinion  in  the  United  States 
condemned  the  Franco's  regime  as  a  fascist  dictatorship.  But  the  United  States  government 
participated in various Allied agreements with Spain, aimed at ensuring that Franco would not 
permit the Iberian Peninsula to be used by Adolf Hitler against Allied forces.  
The  United  States  and  the  European  allies  banned  Spain  from  the  foundation  of  the 
United  Nations.  But  the  realities  of  the  Cold  War  turned  the  fortune  of  the  Franco  regime, 
providing the offer of the military agreements that guaranteed the survival of the Spanish regime 
giving the United States  a foothold  in  a crucial  European territory in  the strategic bombing 
struggle with the Soviet Union.                
The  1953  Pact  of  Madrid  between  Spain  and  the  United  States  provided  for  mutual 
defense  as  well  as  for  United  States  military  aid,  and  it  brought  to  an  end  Spain's  postwar 
isolation. It did not end anti-Americanism in Spain, however. Francoist leaders resented having 
to accept what they considered to be insufficient military supplies in return for basic rights. They 
also  protested  against  U.S.  restrictions  for  the  use  of  equipment  in  defending  Spain's  North 
African territories in 1957. This anti-American sentiment was bipartisan. Francoists resented the 
United States for its democratic form of government, while the opposition perceived Washington 16 
 
as  the  primary  supporter  of  the  Franco  regime  and  therefore  as  a  major  obstacle  to  the 
democratization of Spain.  
Following the death of Franco in 1975, the United States welcomed the liberalization of the 
Spanish regime under King Juan Carlos and sought to bring Spain further into Western military 
arrangements.  In  1976  the  bilateral  Agreement  between  Spain  and  the  United  States  was 
transformed into a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. In addition to renewing U.S. base 
rights in return for United States military and economic aid, this treaty formed a United States-
Spanish Council intended to serve as a bridge to eventual Spanish membership in NATO.  
During the early years of democratic rule, the government's focus was on consolidating 
the parliamentary system. Foreign policy issues received less attention. However, disagreement 
persisted between the governing UCD and the Socialist opposition over Spain's relations with 
NATO and with the United States. When Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo replaced Adolfo Suárez as 
Prime Minister in 1981, he made vigorous efforts to gain approval for Spanish membership in 
NATO, and shortly after this was accomplished a new executive agreement on the use of bases 
in Spain was signed with the United States in July 1982. This agreement was one of a series of 
renewals of the basic 1953 security arrangement, providing for United States use of strategic 
naval  and  air  bases  on  Spanish  soil  in  exchange  for  United  States  military  and  economic 
assistance.  
Many Spaniards still resented the presence of these bases in Spain, recalling the widely 
publicized  photograph  of  United  States  president  Dwight  D.  Eisenhower,  throwing  his  arms 
around Franco when the first agreement on the bases was signed. There were occasional popular 
protests  against  these  reminders  of  United  States  support  for  the  dictatorship,  including  a 
demonstration during U.S. president Ronald Reagan's 1985 visit to Spain.  
The Socialists had consistently advocated a more neutralist, independent role for Spain. 
When they came to power in October 1982, Gonzalez pledged a close examination of the defense 
and cooperation agreements with the United States. A reduction in the United States military 
presence in Spain was one of the stipulations contained in the referendum, held in 1986, on 
continued NATO membership, as mentioned below. In keeping with this, the prime minister 
announced in December 1987 that the United States would have to remove its seventy-two F-16 
fighter-bombers  from  Spanish  bases  by  mid-1991.  Spain  also  informed  the  United  States  in 
November  that  the  bilateral  defense  agreement,  which  opinion  polls  indicated  was  rejected 
overwhelmingly by the Spanish population, would not be renewed. Nevertheless, in January 
1988 Spain and the United States did reach agreement in principle on a new base agreement to 
last eight years. The new military arrangements called for a marked reduction of the United 
States presence in Spain and terminated the United States military and economic aid that had 
been tied to the defense treaty.
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4.3. Latin America: between the colonial legacy and the future 
 
Spain has maintained a “special relationship” with its former colonies in the Americas.
13 
To a large extent, the Spanish strategy has framed its diplomatic activities within a concept 
                                                           
12  For the latest and possibly most complete account of the relationship between Spain and the United States in the 
context of the rebirth of Spanish democracy, see: Charles Powell, El amigo Americano: España y Estados Unidos: 
de la dictadura a la democracia. (Madrid: Galaxia Gutember, 2011).  
 
13  For a selection of studies on Spain’s relations with Latin America see: Celestino del Arenal, (coord.) España y 
América Latina 200 años después de la Independencia. Valoración y perspectivas. (Madrid, Real Instituto Elcano, 17 
 
exemplified by the establishment of the Ibero-American Community. Admitted as a modernized 
version of the traditional Hispanidad, it is based on the links between the Iberian Peninsula 
(Portugal included) and Central and South America, as well as parts of the Caribbean (Cuba and 
Dominican Republic) through language, commerce, history and culture.
14 In this setting, Spain 
has insisted in sharing its experience of th e political transition from dictatorship to democracy, 
respecting the different ideologically-supported regimes and opting for a by -regional approach 
inspiring the overall programs of the European Union, with emphasis on regional integration, 
poverty  reductions,  respect  for  human  rights  and  political  consolidation.  In  recent  years, 
however, the Spanish government, as well as the EU, has been testing a more bilateral approach, 
priming some countries over others.  
The background of this evolution shows that after the rebirth of democracy Spain decided 
to strengthen its influence in Latin America. Gone were the days of the empire. In the initial 
decades of independence, Spain was blamed for the lack of progress in the new republics as a 
legacy of colonial rule. The result was a general disdain for Spain’s values. However, the war of 
1898 and the humiliation suffered under the United States changed the perception of the Latin 
American  elites.  The  United  States  was  seen  as  the  new  menace.  Spain  and  Latin  America 
became closer, but still trade and diplomatic relations remained limited.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Marcial  Pons.  2009);  Celestino  del  Arenal.  La  política  exterior  de  España  hacia  Iberoamérica,  (Madrid,  Ed. 
Complutense, 1994); Juan Carlos Pereira y Angel Cervantes,  Relaciones diplomáticas entre España y América, 
(Madrid, Fundación Mapfre América, 1992); Carlos Rama, Historia de las relaciones culturales entre España y la 
América Latina. Siglo XIX. (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1982).  
 
14  For a selection of studies on this special dimension, see:  Celestino del Arenal y Alfonso Nájera,  España  e 
Iberoamérica. De la Hispanidad a la Comunidad Iberoamericana de Naciones. (Madrid: CEDEAL, 1989); Celestino 
del Arenal y Alfonso Nájera, La Comunidad Iberoamericana de Naciones. Pasado, presente y futuro de la política 
iberoamericana  de  España.  (Madrid:  CEDEAL,  1992);  Castor  M.  Díaz  Barrado,  Perfiles  de  la  Comunidad 
Iberoamericana de Naciones. (Madrid: Casa de América, 1994); Paul Isbell, Carlos Malamud y Federico Steinberg 
(Coords.). Iberoamérica: Realidad frente a mito. De Guadalajara 1991 a Salamanca 2005 (Madrid: Real Instituto 
Elcano,  2005);  Roberto  Mesa,  La  idea  de  Comunidad  Iberoamericana:  Entre  la  utopía  y  la  historia.  (  Madrid: 
CEDEAL, 1989); Joaquín Roy and Albert Galinsoga (eds.), The Ibero-American Space: Dimensions and Perceptions 
of the Special Relationship Between Spain and Latin America. (Miami: Iberian Studies Institute, University of 
Miami/ Lleida: "Jean Monnet" Chair for European Integration, University of Lleida, 1997).  
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During the Franco regime, Spain converted the Latin American scene as the target for its 
“foreign policy of substitution”. Unable to exert influence in Europe due to the dictatorial nature 
of its regime, navigating with limitations in the Arab and Middle region, absent in Asia, the Latin 
American  subcontinent  provided  an  avenue  to  enjoy  international  respectability.  The  regime 
even kept close relations with Marxist Cuba under Castro, rejecting to accept the terms of the 
U.S. embargo. After the Franco regime disappeared, the rebirth of democracy coincided with the 
evolution of certain democratic consolidation in Latin America. Spain then began to act more 
aggressively in the continent under the leadership of Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez, backed by 
the prestigious diplomatic role of King Juan Carlos I, widely admired in Latin America.  
When the Socialists came to power in 1982 Latin America became even more important 
for Spanish interests, a move that was backed by generous development aid programs, especially 
when  Spain  propelled  EU’s  newly  organized  Latin  American  policy  by  promoting  peace, 
democracy  and  regional  integration,  most  especially  in  Central  America,  riddled  by  internal 
confrontations. While the United States government was skeptical about this novel European 
involvement  with  time  Washington  welcome  the  supporting  fields  where  U.S.  backing  was 
lagging. The balance of this involvement was very positive, lasting into the rest of the century. 
The role played by the two Spanish commissioners in Brussels, Abel Matutes and Manuel Marín, 
who  held the portfolios of relations with the region, determined the anchoring of the Latin 
America area in the attention of the EU. 
During the Aznar's two executive terms (1996-2000 and 2000-2004), Spanish relations 
with some Latin-American countries (Mexico, Venezuela and Cuba, especially) became tense for 
different  reasons,  but  were  exceptionally  good  with  others  like  Colombia  the  Dominican 
Republic  and  most  of  the  Central  American  republics.  With  Zapatero's  victory  in  the  2004 
general elections the scenario was changed. Relations with Venezuela got better, a move that was 
not well taken in Washington. Brazil and Chile were substantially strengthened, most specifically 
as  part  of  ambitious  investment  in  sensitive  and  profitable  areas  such  as  communications, 
banking and transportation.   
In recent years, friction has developed with Argentina, due to disagreements over Spanish 
investments and the populist measures taken by the administrations of Hector Kirchner and his 
wife  and  successor  Cristina.  With  Chile,  relations  were  excellent  with  the  coalition 
(“Concertaci￳n”) formed by the Christian Democrats and the Socialists, and have continued to be 
excellent with conservative president Piñera. Same can be said with Uruguay, Perú and most 
especially Colombia, a country that has enjoyed attention of the Zapatero government at the 
same level  as the one given by Aznar. Certain  tensions have developed with by the ALBA 
countries led by Venezuela’s Chávez, because of the populist measures or postures that have 
threatened  Spanish  investments.  The  indigenous  anti-imperialist  attitude  of  Evo  Morales  in 
Bolivia has affected the legal security of Spanish firms. 
In the Caribbean, the Dominican Republic has been for decades a model of cooperation, 
investment and recipient of funds. In fact, Spain was the main actor for the accession of Haiti’s 
neighbor  to  the  ACP  network,  with  the  result  of  an  impressive  volume  of  development  aid 
provided by the EU. In Central America, all democratic governments have backed the social and 
economic development programs, have contributed with funds and military assistance to peace-
making and peace-keeping programs under EU or UN frameworks, and have generously support 
democratic consolidation.  
A special chapter of Spain’s foreign policy should be dedicated to Cuba. The Spanish 
link with the former colony needs to be considered as a very special relationship. Within the EU 
framework,  Spain  has  been  the  leader  of  important  and  unusual  moves  towards  the  Castro 
regime. On the record of keeping close diplomatic, social and economic relations, in spite of 19 
 
political changes in both countries, Spain took the early initiative of opposing U.S. decisions 
curtailing trade (Helm-Burton Act) and at the same time sponsored EU measures conditioning 
cooperation (Common Position). However, under the governments of Aznar and the Socialists, 
Spain has been supporting and leading the  policy of ”constructive engagement”, in tune with 
general EU attitudes maintaining the lines of communication open.
15 
 
5.1. The rest of the world 
 
In recent years, Spain has expanded its rather limited historical presence in Sub -Saharan 
region. For obvious reasons, Madrid has maintained  an interest in its only former colony of 
Equatorial Guinea. In spite of the harsh dictatorial nature of the regime and at times the 
harassment of the government, Spain has maintained a large air program, along a steady flow of 
investment and trade operations. Close relations with countries like Senegal, Mauritania and 
Mali have helped in controlling the illegal immigration to the Canary Islands. 
East from Morocco, Spain is considered as a solid partner in political mediation in the 
Middle East, with no disagreements with very different regimes in the zone, with the exception 
of the late recognition of the state of Israel and the steady support of Palestinian claims. The 
Arab countries have been are a strategic priority for Spain because of oil and gas sourc es. 
Several Arab countries are important investors in Spain. When the Iraq war exploded, the 
Spanish government led by Prime Minister José María Aznar sent troops to join the US -led 
coalition, but after the defeat of his party in the election of 2004, the  new president, José Luis 
Rodríguez Zapatero abruptly withdrew the small military unit, causing a major upset in the Bush 
administration.  In  contrast,  Spain  has  participated  in  the  Afghanistan  operation  since  its 
inception, maintaining a steady number of soldiers, a hundred of them have been killed in action 
and by terrorist attacks.  
  As a latecomer in the Far East, in spite of the early colonial presence (the Philippines), 
Spain has been trying to expand its historically modest relations with East Asian nations. The 
People’s Republic of China and Japan are the main countries of interest in the region. Thailand 
and  Indonesia  have  been  the  main  allies  in  the  important  ASEAN  group.  As  many  other 
European states, Spain has expanded trade and investment in South Korea and Malaysia, and 
even in Vietnam. Lately, India has become a central point of activity for Spanish firms and 
diplomatic activity. Relations with Australia and New Zealand have been cordial and profitable.  
 
 
6.0. Global presence 
 
Worldwide, some sectors of foreign relations have become a priority of the Spanish agenda, in a 
combination of examples of “hard power” and a special brand of “soft power”. Defense and 
military matters have combined with economics, trade and development assistance. All these 
                                                           
15 For a complete review of the relations between the Spain and Cuba, see: Joaquín Roy. The Cuban Revolution 
(1959-2009): its relationship with Spain, the European Union and the United States. (New York: 
Palgrave/McMillan, 2009).  
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sectorial activities have to be taken into account in the context of membership in the European 
Union.     
 
6.1. NATO 
 
As mentioned earlier, during the first years of the Spanish political transition there was an 
almost unanimous backing for Spain's accession to the EC. However, that consensus was not that 
clear with respect to NATO. As was the case during the last decades of the Franco regime, 
Spain's  geographical  position  made  it  a  valuable  partner  for  the  alliance.  Advocates  for 
membership  thought  that  geographical  position  to  be  an  advantage  for  Spain  because  the 
country's strategic location could make it an obvious target in any major conflict unless it had 
allied support. They  also  maintained that integration into NATO would guarantee the  badly 
needed modernization of Spain's armed services in addition to the securing of adequate national 
defense. A corollary hope was that NATO membership would reorient the focus of army leaders 
away from reactionary preoccupations and toward defense of the West. To immunize resentful 
military after the attempted coup of 1981 remained in the background. Alleged pre-condition for 
EU membership was part of the equation. 
However, several Spanish parties, particularly the Socialists and the Communists, did not 
agree that full membership would benefit the country's defense and foreign policy aims. They 
thought it would raise the level of tension between the world power blocs and would make Spain 
a  more  likely  target  in  any  future  conflict  with  the  Soviet  Union.  Opponents  of  NATO 
membership accused that NATO would be of no assistance in areas of primary worry for Spain: 
Ceuta and Melilla, located in North Africa, outside the geographic zone of application of the 
NATO Treaty. They also maintained that NATO would be of no benefit to Spain to recover 
Gibraltar, because it could be assumed that NATO members would support Britain. Resentment 
of  the  United  States  as  the  principal  supporter  of  the  Franco  regime  was  another  factor 
influencing those who opposed Spain's entry into NATO.  
Although Suárez had announced Spain's intention of applying for NATO membership, 
his Union of the Democratic Center (UCD) government remained openly divided. After Suárez 
resigned  in  1981,  his  successor,  Leopoldo  Calvo  Sotelo,  prioritized  this  point.  In  his  view, 
Spain's entry into NATO would speed up negotiations for integration into the EC. In December 
1981, the Spanish Congress approved membership, over the opposition of a large leftist sector. 
The left protested that NATO membership had been pushed through Parliament violating a prior 
consensus. The Socialists organized an aggressive negative campaign, and the PSOE leader, 
González, made the NATO issue a major feature of his electoral program in 1982, promising a 
popular referendum on withdrawal.  However, González later had second thoughts, and he found 
reasons to delay the referendum and finally he advocated a positive vote for limited membership. 
With  60  percent  of  participation,  52.6  percent  of  the  voters  supported  Spain's  continued 
membership, while 39.8 percent opposed it. The following year, in a move seen as emphasizing 
the European aspect of the defense system, González applied for Spanish membership in the 
Western European Union (WEU). In 1988, Spain and Portugal were formally invited to join the 
organization. 
 
6.2. Defense and military international cooperation.    
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As outlined above, since the end of the active Spanish military activity in Europe and the 
defeat in the Americas as result of the anticolonial struggle, the Spanish armed forces had been 
absent in all the major conflicts of the last century (with the exception of the brief intervention in 
Russia). Spanish soldiers were only used in the North of Africa and as internal order force to 
support  the  Franco  regime.  With  the  normalization  of  the  Spanish  army  after  becoming  a 
member of NATO, the Spanish military (fully professional once the draft was terminated) have 
intervened in an array of peace-making and peace-keeping missions, as well as in the training of 
the armed forces of countries in need of democratic order and political consolidation. In June 
2011  Spain  approved  the  Spanish  Security  Strategy  (EES)  and  created  a  Spanish  Security 
Council, succeeding the traditional National Defense Council, translating a shift to a wider sense 
of security, not limited to military matters.
16  Internal and external securities are meshed. While, 
the UN is considered as a permanent framework of Spanish actions, NATO is an obligatory 
mission, although its future is rather confusing, the EU needs to be considered as a permanent 
point of reference. This strategy is in perfect tune with other EU nations, especially the UK and 
France.
17  
In the last two decades more than 100,000 soldiers have served in more than fifty 
scenarios in four continents, most especially in the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East, and 
Central America. 40,000 of them have been in Bosnia, making the mission a success story in this 
modality. Today Spanish troops still serve in the EUFOR -Althea operation in Bosnia, are an 
integral part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, have been 
inserted in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and in the European Union’s 
Atlanta operation to fight piracy off the coast of Somalia, and in the mission of training the 
security of this country. The total number of troops is over 3,500. 
 However,  all  Spanish  military  operations  are  in  danger  of  suffering  a  decrease  in 
effectiveness because of the economic crisis. An additional measure included in the drastic cuts 
in  government  spending as  a  result of the demands  of the EU is  the  abandonment of large 
investments in weapons systems. Alternatives include the reselling of some of the important 
arms to other countries of regions.
18 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
16For a complete text and analysis, see CIDOB, “The Spanish Security Strategy (EES). Everyone's responsibility” 
(Barcelona 2011) 
http://www.cidob.org/en/publications/monographs/monographs/the_spanish_security_strategy_ees_everyone_s_resp
onsibility 
 
17Javier Solana. “Espa￱a ante el nuevo mundo”. El País, 28 marzo 2011; El País. “Más seguridad”, 28 junio 2011. 
      
 
18  Ignacio Fuente Cobo,“La cooperaci￳n militar espa￱ola en los países iberoamericanos” (Madrid: Centro Superior 
de la Defensa, 2007). 
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6.3. Impact of EU membership on the economy 
 
During  the  first  two  decades  of  Spain's  membership  in  the  EU  the  arrangement  was 
extremely  economically  beneficial.  Spain  became  the  8th  largest  economy  in  the  world. 
Prosperity  lasted  until  2007.  Growth  was  spectacularly  fast.  During  the  first  decade  of 
membership in the EU the average yearly growth rose to from 3 percent to nearly 5 percent, a 
record in the countries of the OECD. Major construction in infrastructure led to the lowering of 
the unemployment rate from 18 percent to 10 percent. Within the EU Spain’s GDP rose from 8 
percent to 9.7 percent.  In comparative terms, data shows that the overall economic indexes 
expanded by 64.6 percent in the first twenty years of EU membership, while the rest averaged an 
increase of 47.9 percent.  Incomes in Spain rose from 71 percent of the EU-15 average to more 
than 90 percent in 2006. Inflation descended to only one point above the countries of the euro 
zone. Public spending increased from 25% of the GDP existing in 1978 to 40 percent in 2006. 
During the first years of the new century, Spain created more than 50 percent of the new jobs.  
In sectors,  growth  was  also  impressive:  the major road system  expanded from  2,000 
kilometers  in  1985  to  10,000  kilometers  in  2002,  resulting  in  a  more  effective  domestic 
communication, open to the world. Spain now has the largest high speed train network in the 
world, only second to China. The tourism industry was one of the beneficiaries of growth: 12 
percent of GDP in 2006, providing 10 percent of employment, making Spain the second world 
tourist destination. From a country of emigration, it received multitudes of foreign workers, of all 
origins,  mostly  from  North  Africa  and  Latin  America.  Spanish  multinational  companies 
expanded around the world, most specially in Latin America. 
But then, the strength of the euro, a European integration success, provoked a reduction 
of interest rates, propelling growth to unsustainable levels without the necessary infrastructure 
reform. A sudden rise of prices and wages caused a large external deficit and an increase in the 
external debt, which was necessary to level the external unbalance. The 2008 world crisis and the 
explosion of the building bubble hit hard the country. In May of 2010 the Government wrongly 
admitted that Spain was also under the impact of the global problems and took drastic measures 
under the pressure of the EU, the United States and the IMF. The aim was to avoid the fate of 
Greece to salvage the welfare state system and maintenance of the euro, and of the EU itself, a 
primary preoccupation of Spain and the Brussels. 
19 
In sum, continuous prosperity for Spain is over and its future within the EU’s economy is 
uncertain.  However,  if  corrective  measures  are  applied  in  a  wise  and  effective  way  Spain’s 
economy  can  successfully  survive.  The  fabric  of  the  country  and  the  human  and  natural 
resources are a guarantee for that goal. The EU and the West can barely afford a failed Spain. 
The  commitment  of  Germany  and  France  and  all  the  rest  of  the  euro  zone  countries  is  a 
guarantee for the success of the euro as a political project. All involved entities (private and 
                                                           
19 Francesc Granell. “Spain’s Management of the Economy since 1986”, Joaquín Roy and Maria Lorca. Spain in the 
European Union: the First Fifty Years (1986-2006). (Miami: European Union Center/Jean Monnet Chair, 2011), pp. 
193- 210.   
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public) have the capacity to learn from mistakes. The citizens at large understand the need to 
apply the serious measures undertaken. 
Even in the current times of crisis, some economic sectors seem brighter than others. One 
is the tourist industry. Even during the time before the rebirth of Spanish democracy, tourism has 
been a major source of the economy, making the sector a crucial one for the country’s stability. 
Spain (52.68 million) has been ranked as No 3 tourism power in the world, only surpassed in 
absolute figures by the France (76.80 million) and the United States (59.75 million), although 
more recent China (55.67 million) has captured spot no. 3. This privilege position of Spain seems 
to be enriched in recent times: during the first semester of 2011, Spain received 32.3 million 
international tourists. 
20  
 
 
6.4. Trade and investment 
Spain has experienced a considerable increase in its export activity in the past decade. It 
is worth noting that this activity did pick up particularly after 2002, the year when the euro was 
fully introduced, physically and nominally (see Graph 1). In spite of this, the economic crisis that 
has affected the world has brutally impacted Spain.  In 2 010 Spain’s export activity dropped to 
levels which were even lower than those reported at the beginning of the new century. However, 
recent trends and data show that the export sector experienced a considerable increased during 
the first part of 2011. This fact produced for the first time in years a surplus in foreign trade. The 
predominance of the European Union countries as a destination of Spanish exports is further 
dramatized by the fact that 33 percent of Spanish exports go to France, Italy and the United 
Kingdom.   
  
Graph 1. Spain’s Export Activity 
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The  import  activity  of  Spain  has  been  very  moderate  during  the  same  decade.  It  actually 
increased during the expansionary phase of the business cycle and peak in 2008 (see Graph 2). 
Afterwards, the activity has suffered a significant drop which is in line with the current economic 
slowdown. 
 
 
 
                                                           
20 Source: Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade. 24 
 
Graph 2. Spain’s Import Activity 
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Spanish foreign investment has been very impressive during the past decade (see Graph 3). It is 
significant  to  note  that  that  the  majority  of  these  investments  have  taken  place  within  the 
European Union. One explanation for this preference is the fact that Spain can take advantage of 
the common market. The facility of transferring of  capital is in Spain’s favor. Similarly, the 
foreign investment trend has coincided with the business cycle trend; thus, there was a sudden 
drop after 2007. However, the declining in overall foreign investment fortunately turned since 
2009, when Spain increased its foreign investment levels again. Still, it should be noted that 
foreign  investments  in  the  U.S.  and  Latin  America  is  not  as  important  as  it  is  in  the  EU.  
However, investments in Latin America proportionally increased, making Spain the number 1 
investor in some countries of the Southern Cone, ahead of the rest of Europe and the United 
States.
21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
21 
21 For samples of research on investment in Latin America with Spanish  participation, see: Banco Interamericano 
de Desarrollo,  Inversión  extranjera  directa  en  América  Latina:  la  perspectiva  de  los  principales  inversores. 
(Madrid: IRELA, 1998); Casilda Béjar, R. (ed.). La gran apuesta. Globalización y multinacionales españolas en 
América Latina. Análisis de los protagonistas (Barcelona: Granica, 2008); William Chislett, La inversión española 
directa en América Latina: retos y oportunidades. (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2003); William Chislett,  Spanish 
Direct Investment in Latin América: Challenges and Opportunities. (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2003); Félix 
Martín, and Pablo Toral, eds., Latin America's Quest for Globalization: The Role of Spanish Firms. (Burlington: 
Ashgate,  2005);  Pablo  Toral,  The  Reconquest  of  the  New  World:  Multinational  enterprises  and  Spain’s  direct 
investment in Latin America.  (Aldershot:  Ashgate, 2001); Ziga Vodusek, (ed.),  Inversión extranjera directa en 
América Latina: el papel de los inversores europeos. (Washington, D. C.: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, 
2002);  Joaquín Roy. “The Latin American image of Spain in the aftermath of recent investments”, Latin America's 
Quest for Globalisation: The Role of Spanish Firms. Félix E. Martín and Pablo Toral (eds.). (Aldershot: Ashgate 
2005), pp. 287-305.  
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Graph 3. 
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6.5. International Cooperation and Development aid. 
  
Spain is a leader in the field of development cooperation, targeting poverty and hunger in 
the world, as an integral part of its foreign policy. Programs encompass not only a strategy to 
increase income and the ability to acquire goods, but including rights, opportunities and abilities 
of the people in need. The defense of human rights, environmental conservation, gender equality 
and respect for cultural diversity are also integral part of the policy, wh ich enjoys a broad 
consensus not only in the governmental and congressional circles but also in the realm of the 
autonomous  communities,  local  entities,  and  the  civilian  population  at  large  though  active 
NGO’s funded by public and private sources. 
The global Spanish action is coordinated by the 2009-2010 Master Plan for Cooperation, 
a  framework  document  that  lines  up  the  objectives,  criteria,  and  priorities  for  cooperative 
development.  This  plan,  executed  in  close  coordination  with  international  agencies,  aims  at 
greater  policy  consistency  and  improved  Official  Aid  to  Development  (OAD)  management 
policy. Spain is committed to double the aid contribution, with the ultimate aim of reaching the 
prescribed volume of 0.7 percent of the Gross Domestic Product. The Millennium Declaration 
developed by the United Nations is a point of reference. 
There is also a commitment to include at least 20 percent of the bilateral GDP to support 
basic  social  services  (education  and  health)  while  strengthening  the  commitment  to  the 
Developing Countries, which will receive at least 20 percent of the Official Aid to Development. 
Latin America and the Mediterranean are to be the main areas of attention, but Sub-Saharan 
Africa has recently become the target of special care. In fact, Spanish public opinion primes 
support for Africa over the traditional assistance to Latin America. 
A review of Spain’s development assistance over the last two decades reveals that the 
policy emphasis has oscillated between the Popular Party’s preference for inserting aid in the 
context of Spanish investments and the priority given by the Socialists for programs emphasizing 
social issues. It remains to be seen what the PP policy could be in the event of an electoral 26 
 
victory in the Fall of 2011. In any event, both strategies suffer the impact of the financial crisis 
and the reduction of government budgets.               
 
7.0. Closing 
7.1. Evaluation. 
A customary general review of Spain’s foreign policy since the recovery of democracy 
claims to have been rather stable. As seen above, only some concrete exceptions (the initial 
disagreement  over  membership  in  NATO)  are  part  of  the  official  record.  However,  closer 
analysis reveals that Spain’s foreign balance has had several important inconsistencies, caused 
by major serious reversals in the internal political framework. The fact is that a crucial chapter of 
foreign policy performed by premier José Maria Aznar was the backbone of the electoral victory 
of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero in 2004 and his double mandate. The terrorist attacks in Madrid 
of March 11, 2004, were provoked as a retaliation by Al Qaeda for the intervention of Spanish 
armed forces in Iraq and the close symbiosis of Aznar with Bush. The major reason for the defeat 
of the PP in the election of a few days later was generated by the faulty handling of the crisis, 
accusing ETA terrorists of the attack. The fact remains that the foreign dimension played a major 
role in the change of government and stayed evident in the first term of the Zapatero mandate 
(2004-2008), surviving until what in the summer of 2011 appeared to be the exhaustion of the 
PSOE governmental control, with the calling for new elections.  
The  alternative  PSOE  foreign  strategy  was  composed  of  innovative  measures  and 
decisions, among them the design of the “Alliance of Civilizations” (under the full backing of the 
UN), in contrast with Bush’s “war on terror”. At the same time, the government announced an 
increase of aid volume to reach the desired  0.7% GDP, as set in the UN Millennium Declaration 
Goals.  Moreover,  Zapatero  joined  the  conservative-social  democratic  alliance  formed  by  the 
Franco-German axis, in opposition to Aznar’s positioning with the US-UK band. On top of that, 
a new defense policy favored European security identity, downsizing the preeminence of NATO 
and links with the United States. 
The composed panorama of these ingredients favored an activity in multilateral circles, 
preferably the UN and the EU, with special attention to global governance, multilateralism and 
international law. The PP opposition found this policy as weak for negotiations and inadequate to 
defend the interests of the country and to identify correctly the realities of the world scenarios 
facing  terrorism.  In  sum,  both  defended  their  points  of  view  as  reflecting  national  interest 
requiring a consensus, impossible to obtain. Experts attribute this frustration to the omnipresent 
aim of presence of the consensus since the rebirth of democracy, as way to legitimize an overall 
democratic policy.  
However, a closer analysis found major shortcomings in the results of this general policy 
and the impact of the application of the ideology behind the programs that were executed. On 
paper, Spain’s policies match the normative values of the EU. However, implementation is not 
an easy operation when confronting specific national interests and constraints. Domestic policies 
and plans do not meet at all times with the practical external actions.  
It  is  a fact  that during  the Zapatero’s administration the priorities  of his  government 
prioritized basic individual (equality) and social rights (welfare and immigrant conditions). The 27 
 
foreign record, however, shows that the same passion has not been quite applied. Some areas 
(poverty, water availability) were stressed while others (same sex marriage and abortion) were 
de-emphasized, most especially in the specific scene of Latin America. Conditionality in aid 
delivering was not at the top of the agenda. Same can be said for the implementation of asylum 
policies, showing a cautious Spanish attitude.  
This profile is rather obvious in the content of the Plan Director
22, were the key words 
are tame “good  governance” and  “institutional strengthening”. The situation revealed by the 
explosion of the Arab crisis has shown an array of contrasting and sometimes embarrassing 
Spanish policies dealing with autocratic regimes in North Africa and the Middle East. Same can 
be said for the relations with the three last Spanish colonies (Cuba, Morocco and Equatorial 
Guinea). Experts point out the lack of coordination in aid policies and the absence of clear 
reporting  documentation  on  the  progress  of  the  expected  results  of  Spanish  actions,  most 
especially  considering  the  lessons  of  the  country’s  past  authoritarian  legacy.  In  part  this 
paradoxical behavior can be attributed to the Zapatero’s government opposition for the policies 
of  U.S.  president  George  Bush  overstressing  the  fight  against  international  terrorism.  An 
additional factor is that Spain has been affected by the same double standards and hypocrisy that 
have been the norm of many EU and developed world countries. In sum, Spain has strengthened 
its European and Western status by incorporating ambivalent foreign policy political agendas.
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7.2. Globalization Position 
  
Without  the  traditional  limitations  of  measurement  of  relative  and  absolute  power 
(economic, political or military) of countries, there are other methods of evaluating the p osition 
of certain states in the wide context of globalization. The Indice Elcano de Presencia Global 
(IEPG) is a new tool developed by the prestigious Madrid think tank. It profiles the foreign 
projection of a given country in the economic, military, scie ntific, social and cultural fields. 
Population  trends  and  development  aid  are  also  considered.  Had  power  arguments  are 
supplemented by factors of soft power. The index does not reflect how powerful or influential is 
a given state, but what its international positioning actually is. After selecting 54 countries that 
rank ahead of the rest, evidence shows that all 42 with larger GDP are present, as well as all G -
20 member countries. The ranking then shows that the United States is logically the country with 
the largest world presence. Germany, France, the United Kingdom, China and Japan following. 
Spain occupies spot no. 9. 
The ranking reveals that some countries are apparently less positioned in the world than 
their actual geopolitical and economic influence  –they are boxing above their global position. 
This is the case of BRICS India (No. 18), Brazil (No. 25), South Africa (No, 35. In contrast, 
                                                           
22 Plan Director de la Cooperación Española 2009-2012, and Plan Anual de Cooperación Internacional (PACI 2010). 
 
23José Ignacio Torreblanca, “A Democratic Audit of Spain’s Foreign Policy”. Spain in the European Union: the 
First Fifty Years (1986-2006). Joaquín Roy and María Lorca-Susino (eds.) Miami: European Union Center/Jean 
Monnet Chair, 2011. pp. 232-250.  http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/books/SPAIN-EU-25-allPDF.pdf. 
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some others are better positioned (Canada, No. 10; Italy, No. 8), but they do not have similar 
influence or power –they are boxing bellow their potential. This is the case of Spain. While 
Spain  does  not  ambition  to  be  a  regional  power  (as  some  countries  with  lower  global 
positioning),  it  has  the  potential  of  projection  in  other  non-European  regions,  such  as  Latin 
America. The Spanish language is a world asset, not limited to Europe.  
In  sum,  the  improvement  of  Spain  in  this  global  positioning  dimension  is  rather 
impressive.  At  the  end  of  the  ‘80s  Spain  did  not  have  multinational  companies,  any  troops 
abroad,  little  immigration,  poor  sports  hegemony,  with  very  small  development  cooperation 
activities.  Today  Spain  has  a  notable  presence  in  multilateral  forums  and  is  very  active  in 
bilateral linkages. However, a word of caution is needed. While it is true that the global presence 
is  consolidated,  there  is  the  risk  of  boxing  below  its  level.  Photo  opportunities  may  not  be 
enough for exercising influence and make a lasting impact.
24  
        
 
7.3. Conclusion 
 
The relatively positive situation of Spain’s in today’s international scene, making the 
country a suitable partner for alliances and compromises, shows that single disputes with other 
countries are rare and simply are the remain of historical factors that seem to be very difficult to 
drastically correct. With the exception of very few time occasions, they have not been the cause 
for drastic disagreements, although confrontations happened.  
As  a  conclusion,  a  central  question  remains:  are  Spain’s  foreign  policy  and  global 
relations in tune with the overall international behavior of the European Union and its most 
important member states? The answer is, in general terms, a solid “yes”. Only minor corrections 
can  be  detected  in  certain  concrete  scenarios  and  peripheral  issues.  These  make  Spain  a 
“different”  country.  The  dimensions  of  Spain’s  foreign  policy  that  could  be  considered  as 
peculiar in the EU setting are only a reflection of specific “special relationships” that reflect the 
lasting impact of history or are a sign of geographical constraints. These special dimensions 
would not make the country today an uncomfortable candidate for membership in the European 
Union, as they were not in 1986 when the actual accession took place.  
In fact, the Spanish specificities today make them complementary to the overall minimal 
EU “foreign policy”. Where the EU as a whole can’t reach, Spain can contribute towards the 
collective  success.  Vice  versa,  in  the  scenarios  and  issues  where  Spain  does  not  have  the 
capacity, membership in the EU enables the Spanish government to have a saying. The practical 
example of the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) is a proof this 
thesis. Spain can offer the intensive network of diplomatic and development aid in place in Latin 
America, where it can mediate in crisis. The same can be said, in a smaller capacity, in the 
Middle East and North Africa.  
 Taking  into  account  the  current  world  circumstances,  a  careful  assessment  needs  to 
accept that Zapatero’s policies were in part designed and executed to redress the actions taken by 
                                                           
24 Ignacio Molina e Iliana Olivié. “IEPG: un índice para medir la posici￳n de los países en la  globalizaci￳n”. 
Análisis del Instituto Elcano. Política Exterior. Mayo-junio 2011.                29 
 
Aznar,  who  in  turn  reversed  the  consensus  that  had  existed  during  the  Felipe  González 
administrations. The PP leader opted for following Bush’s agenda based on hard power. Judging 
the Aznar period as an exception in recent Spanish history, Zapatero elected to recover a space 
for Spain in the EU and world scene inspired by the effectiveness of soft power. However, this 
strategy was cemented on rather optimistic terms does not take into serious consideration that the 
coming years should present similar positive economic conditions as the ones existing in 1994-
2008. (Pereira). In realistic terms, Spain will have to accept the standing fact that while the EU is 
in trouble and decisions are harder due to the inter-governmental trend, still some members have 
a decisive saying. Called “axis” or “triumvirates” the reality is that Madrid has to accept to 
follow guidelines from Berlin or Paris, or both. And that may be in the best interest of Spain, 
although reluctantly.      
Any reasonable script will also require a serious consensus forged again between the PP 
(ready to take power) and the PSOE (exhausted of suffering the consequences of the economic 
crisis, or worse, in opposition) (Pereira). This uncertain picture will develop in a global scene 
that may be very different than the currently existing. The EU (and that is already a fact not a 
prediction) may not be same as the one facing today’s economic and social challenges. New 
powers are rising and making the leadership of the United States questionable. Spain will have to 
choose wisely, balancing its own national interests and values.  
 
 
 